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Exploring African Host Countries’
Agency to Strengthen Local FDI
Regulations: The Case of Chinese
Investments in the
Infrastructure Sector of the DRC
Sanne van der Lugt†
Studies on China-Africa relations often criticize Chinese firms for vio-
lating human rights and neglecting their responsibility to protect the envi-
ronment.  Some authors have even accused “the Chinese” of neo-
colonialism.  More recent studies emphasize the responsibility of the host
governments to protect the environment and the rights of local workers.
What, however, can African host country governments actually do to real-
ize the potentials of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) while manag-
ing the environmental and social impacts?  The main argument of this
Article is that thorough knowledge regarding the motives of foreign inves-
tors gives host countries better insight into their capacity to strengthen
their FDI regulation.  Current FDI theory does not sufficiently explain the
motives behind Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) and focuses too
much on the factors associated with the host country (pull factors) and the
foreign firm.  More recent attempts to explain the motives behind Chinese
and other emerging market ODI focus merely on the factors associated
with the home country (push factors).  This Article introduces a framework
from the field of migration studies in an attempt to integrate push, pull,
intervening, and firm-specific factors into one comprehensive framework.
The case of the investments of a specific Chinese construction company in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is used to develop further the
idea of a comprehensive framework that includes push, pull, intervening,
and firm-specific factors.
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Introduction
Since the Chinese government introduced the Go Global strategy in
1999, many Chinese companies have started to explore foreign markets for
investment opportunities.  The outward direct investment (ODI) flows
from China really started to take off from 2003 onwards— when private
companies were also allowed to invest abroad— and increased from USD
2.9 billion in 2003 to USD 101 billion in 2013.1  This astonishing increase
in Chinese ODI over the past decade has attracted much scholarly atten-
tion, especially from Western scholars interested in Chinese ODI flows to
the African continent.  The sudden rise of China in Africa took Western
politicians by surprise, because Africa has been taken for granted as the
backyard of Europe since colonial times and the playground of the West
following the end of the Cold War.  The presence of thirty-five African
Heads of State at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Sum-
mit and Third Ministerial Conference held in Beijing in 2006 suddenly
made Western politicians aware of growing Chinese influence on the
continent.2
Since this summit in 2006, Western-based scholars, think-tanks, and
NGOs have scrutinized Chinese economic activities on the African conti-
nent even more closely.3  The focus has been mainly on human rights vio-
lations and environmental degradation caused by Chinese economic
activities on the continent— neglecting the fact that Western-based multina-
1. UNCTADSTAT, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740 (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
2. See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC (July 18, 2012), http://www
.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t952503.htm.
3. See, e.g., Stephen Brown & Chandra Lekha Sriram, China’s Role in Human Rights
Abuses in Africa: Clarifying Issues in Culpability, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND
INFLUENCE 250, 251– 54 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008); Stephanie Rupp, Africa and China,
Engaging Postcolonial Interdependencies, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE
65, 65 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008); INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE,
SCOPING STUDY OF THE CHINA-AFRICA TIMBER TRADING CHAIN (2009), http://cmsdata.iucn
.org/downloads/china_africa_trading_web.pdf.; JOHANNA JANSSON ET AL., CHINESE COMPA-
NIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OF GABON & THE DRC: PERCEPTIONS OF TRANSPARENCY
(2009), http://www.ccs.org.za/wpcontent/uploads/2009/11/Chinese_Companies_in_
the_Extractive_Industries_of_Gabonand_the_DRC._CCS_report_August_2009.pdf;
JOHANNA JANSSON, PATTERNS OF CHINESE INVESTMENT, AID AND TRADE IN CENTRAL AFRICA
(CAMEROON, THE DRC AND GABON) (2009), http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/
2009/11/CCS-Central-Africa-Briefing-Paper-August-2009.pdf.
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tionals often act in a similar way.4  More recent studies emphasize the
responsibility of the host governments to protect the environment and the
rights of local workers.5  What can host country governments do, however,
to realize the potentials of incoming Chinese FDI while avoiding potential
negative social and environmental impacts?  The main argument in this
Article is that one means is through a clear understanding of the motives
that underpin these Chinese investors.  A clearer understanding of the
motives behind Chinese investments could help policy makers of FDI host
countries determine which regulations and laws can be tightened without
risking the loss of investors or potential investors.
The current challenge is that mainstream international business (IB)
theory does not adequately explain the motives of Chinese investors.  This
theory has been built largely on the study of Western firms by Western
researchers, and the contextual factors of the home countries— namely, the
United Kingdom and the United States— could have been regarded as famil-
iar and quite similar.6  As a consequence, mainstream IB theory neglects
push factors (factors associated with the home country) and focuses
mainly on ownership advantages, internalization advantages, and pull fac-
tors (factors associated with the host country) in order to explain the inter-
national location choice of investors.7
Molding the explanations of the motives behind Chinese ODI so that it
fits general FDI theory is not contributing to a better understanding of the
real motives behind Chinese ODI.  Instead of merely questioning the appli-
cability of general FDI theory to the study of Chinese ODI, it would be
more useful to establish a comprehensive framework that serves to study
the motives behind FDI from any country of origin.  The argument in this
Article is that home country (push), host country (pull), firm-specific, and
intervening factors influence each other and together determine the loca-
tion choice for investment.  Push and pull factors are currently mentioned
in FDI studies but do not refer to a specific theory.8  Without embedding
push and pull factors in a theory, however, push and pull factors are rather
“floating around” in FDI studies instead of offering a scheme.  This Article
4. See, e.g., Brown & Sriram, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. HANSEN, FROM ENCLAVE TO LINKAGE ECONOMIES? A REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE ON LINKAGES BETWEEN EXTRACTIVE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
LOCAL INDUSTRY IN AFRICA (2014), https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24537/up
loads; MIKE MORRIS ET AL., COMMODITIES AND LINKAGES: MEETING THE POLICY CHALLENGE
(2011), http://oro.open.ac.uk/30049/1/MMCP_Paper_14.pdf.
6. See, e.g., John H. Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the MNE: A
Search for an Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
395, 399 (Bertil Ohlin et al. eds., 1977).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., SHAOMING CHENG & ROGER R. STOUGH, THE PATTERN AND MAGNITUDE OF
CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI IN ASIA (2007), http://test.icrier.org/pdf/Shaoming%20Cheng%
20and%20Roger%20R%20Stough.doc.; Deepak Sethi et al., Seeking Greener Pastures: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation into the Changing Trend of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Flows in Response to Institutional and Strategic Factors, 11 INT’L BUS. REV. 685
(2002); Brenda Sternquist, International Expansion of US Retailers, 25 INT’L J. RETAIL &
DISTRIB. MGMT. 262 (1997).
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introduces a push-pull framework developed by Everett S. Lee in migration
theory that seems to be extremely relevant for FDI theory.9  The main
research question that is answered in this Article is: What is the implica-
tion of applying the push-pull framework from migration theory in FDI
theory for our understanding of the potential for host country governments
to strengthen their FDI regulation?  It is argued that by referring explicitly
to push and pull factors and placing those in a framework together with
firm-specific factors and intervening factors, researchers will be better
equipped to deal with the compound nature of factors that encourage or
attract FDI and the complex relationship between these factors.
I. Literature Review
There are two questions that have been, and are still, central to FDI
theory: why do firms invest abroad, and why do they invest in a particular
economy?  The common starting point of most FDI theory is that investors
pursue profit maximization.10  The simple answer to the question, “why do
firms invest abroad?” is therefore, in general, “to make profit.”  This answer
is, however, not satisfactory and raises further questions about the specific
circumstances that trigger outward FDI and the balance between the risks
involved in, and the profit that can be made, by investing abroad.  FDI the-
ory has developed over time in search of an answer to these and other
questions.
The first focus was on ownership advantages, which address the ques-
tion of why some firms invest abroad but others do not.  Hymer suggested
that a successful multinational has some firm-specific advantages which
allow it to overcome the costs of operating in a foreign country.11  Yet,
ownership advantages per se are not adequate to explain why FDI takes
place.  Establishing parts of a business in a foreign country involves risks
and, therefore, there must be an explanation for why investors establish
their businesses in a foreign country instead of licensing or selling to a
foreign firm and trading with them.  During his study of the firm, Coase
developed the idea of transaction costs.12  Brown and Hogendorn summa-
rize Coase’s theory as follows: “A firm would follow an internal route if
transaction costs exceeded administration costs and would follow an exter-
nal route if the reverse were true.”13  In other words, a firm will invest in a
new or existing production line of a product instead of purchasing the
product from another company when it is relatively cheaper to invest than
to purchase.  Buckley and Casson built further on the Coasian nature of
the firm and developed the internalization theory in order to analyze the
9. See Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, 3 DEMOGRAPHY 47 (1966).
10. See generally Guy V.G. Stevens, The Determinants of Investment, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 47 (John H. Dunning ed., 1974).
11. See STEPHEN HERBERT HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS:
A STUDY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 41– 42 (1976).
12. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392– 94 (1937).
13. See WILSON B. BROWN & JAN S. HOGENDORN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND CONTEXT 632 (1994).
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behavior of the multinational enterprise (MNE) and the motives for out-
ward FDI.14
Dunning argues that although ownership-specific and internalization
advantages are necessary conditions for outward FDI to take place, it must
be profitable to use these advantages in combination with at least some
factors associated with the country of destination (or location-specific
advantages); otherwise the foreign market could be served exclusively by
exports.15  Dunning integrated a variety of strands of thinking about the
necessary conditions for a firm to invest abroad into the ownership, loca-
tion, and internalization (OLI) framework.16  This framework identifies
ownership, location, and internalization advantages and is currently the
most widely used framework among FDI scholars.17  Examples of location-
specific advantages (or pull-factors) are favorable government policy; avail-
ability, quality, and costs of labor; energy, materials, components, and
semi-finished goods; and good infrastructure.18  In other words, the loca-
tion-specific advantages in the OLI framework refer to the factors that
attract investors to a certain host country.19  Because, however, the loca-
tion-specific advantages only refer to factors associated with the host coun-
try, the OLI framework neglects the importance of the factors associated
with the home country.20
The rise of emerging economies and the consequent diversification of
FDI flows led to a focus on the influence of the conditions in the home
countries on the location choice of FDI.21  This focus led to a realization
that push factors that had been neglected thus far should be included in IB
theory.22  Too much emphasis, however, on push factors and an exaggera-
tion of the role of the Chinese government led to simplistic conclusions.
14. See PETER J. BUCKLEY & MARK CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE (1976).
15. See Dunning, supra note 6, at 399.
16. See id.
17. KJETIL BJORVATN ET AL., ON THE ROAD TO SAMARKAND: GLOBALISATION AND THE
SWEDISH ECONOMY 21– 22 (2008). See also Shannon L. Blanton & Robert G. Blanton,
Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment: A Two-Stage Analysis, 45 BUS. & SOC’Y 464,
465 (2006); Marco Sanfilippo, Chinese FDI to Africa: What is the Nexus with Foreign
Economic Cooperation?, 22 AFR. DEV. REV. 599, 599 (2010); M. Berk Talay et al., Share-
holder Value Creation in International Joint Ventures: The Case of the US Automotive Indus-
try, 4 STRATEGIC MGMT. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
18. JOHN H. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE 81 (12th ed. 2013).
19. See Talay, supra note 17, at 5.
20. See id. (discussing the various factors that influence the OLI framework, all of
which focus on the advantages of the host country).
21. See, e.g., Peter J. Buckley et al., The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign
Direct Investment, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 499, 500 (2007); John Child & Suzana B. Rodri-
gues, The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case for Theoretical Extension?, 1
MGMT. & ORG. REV. 381, 392 (2005); Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, What Determines Chi-
nese Outward FDI?, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 26, 29 (2012); Tajul A. Masron & Amirul Shah M.
Shahbudin, ‘Push Factors’ of Outward FDI: Evidence from Malaysia and Thailand, 5 J. BUS.
& POL’Y RES. 54, 58 (2010); Bala Ramasamy et al., China’s Outward Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: Location Choice and Firm Ownership, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 17, 20 (2012).
22. See, e.g., Ramasamy, supra note 21, at 20.
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Buckley et al. argue, for example, that Chinese firms invest in high-risk
countries because of easy access to finance and other support from the
Chinese government.23  Morck et al. explain that some competitive “disad-
vantages” of Chinese firms listed by Child and Rodrigues are actually
advantages when investing in certain Asian and African countries.24  Fur-
ther, they state that Chinese firms’ expertise in managing complex markets
actually makes them more capable than their Western counterparts “of
dealing with burdensome regulations and navigating around the opaque
political constraints.”25  While these arguments might explain how Chi-
nese firms are able to invest in such high risk countries, they do not
explain why they choose to invest in them.
When focusing on the differences between investors, the most perti-
nent factors that influence a particular investor might be overlooked.
Recent empirical studies on Chinese ODI fail to show the complex relation-
ship between factors associated with the home country (push factors), fac-
tors associated with the host country (pull factors), and firm-specific
factors.26  Furthermore, these studies often neglect the subjectivity of the
evaluation of the conditions in both the home and host country per indi-
vidual investor.27  What remains missing in the existing IB theory on the
determinants of ODI is the integration of both the push and pull factors
with the firm-specific factors (not just advantages) in an elaborate frame-
work that explains the interaction between these different factors.
Such an elaborate framework does exist within migration theory.  The
push-pull theory can be traced back to the pioneering work of Ravenstein
in 1885, who tried to establish laws of migration after Farr remarked that
migration “appeared to [occur] without any definite law.”28  Lee built fur-
ther on Ravenstein’s work and established what is now being referred to as
the “push-pull theory.”29  Lee’s framework consists of four categories of
factors that influence migration flows: factors associated with the area of
origin (later referred to as push factors), factors associated with the area of
destination (later referred to as pull factors), intervening obstacles, and
personal factors.30  Lee demonstrates the first three factors schematically
as follows:
23. See Buckley, supra note 21, at 501.
24. See Child & Rodrigues, supra note 21, at 388; Randall Morck et al., Perspectives
on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 337, 345– 46 (2008).
25. See Morck, supra note 24, at 346.
26. See, e.g., id. (examining the push, pull, and firm-specific factors but not the rela-
tionship between them).
27. See, e.g., id.
28. See E.G. Ravenstein, The Laws of Migration, 48 J. STAT. SOC’Y LONDON 167, 167
(1885) (quoting Dr. William Farr).
29. See Lee, supra note 9.
30. Id. at 50.
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The personal factors do not appear in this framework and should be
seen as the factors that influence the perception of the other factors— in
other words, as a pair of glasses through which the other factors are evalu-
ated.32  The ‘+’ signs represent the factors that “hold people within the area
or attract people to it,” and the ‘– ’ signs represent the factors that “tend to
repel them.”33
It is of course clear that capital is not the same as a person.  Capital
does not make decisions; decision-makers in firms make decisions.  The
decision making process within a large firm to invest abroad is more com-
plex than the decision making process of a person— or even a large family—
to migrate.  One may argue, however, that an investor’s decision to invest
abroad is also based on a calculus of factors associated with the area of
“origin” (push factors), factors associated with the area of “destination”
(pull factors), and intervening factors.  In addition, the structure of the
decision-making within the firm and its firm-specific advantages and dis-
advantages can be taken into account in a similar way as the personal fac-
tors are taken into account in Lee’s framework: namely, as a pair of glasses
through which the other factors are evaluated.  Therefore, this study uses
Lee’s framework as a basis for analyzing the motives behind Chinese
investments in the infrastructure sector in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC).  Before discussing the case, the following section will
explain the methods of this study.
II. Method
This study is a case study that falls within the qualitative research
paradigm because the goal is to describe and understand the factors that
influence a Chinese contractor’s motives for investing in the infrastructure
sector in the DRC.  In line with the epistemology of the qualitative research
paradigm,34 the investors’ perception of the push, pull, and intervening
31. Id.
32. Id. at 51.
33. Id. at 50.
34. See Gareth Morgan & Linda Smircich, The Case for Qualitative Research, 5 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 491, 497– 98 (1980).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN106.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-MAY-16 17:06
186 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
factors is regarded as subjective and depends upon their firm-specific fac-
tors and the time frame of the investment.  Currently, most studies on the
motives behind Chinese ODI flows to Africa are based upon statistical cor-
relation.35  According to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, however, the depth
and complexity of case study data can better illuminate the ways in which
such correlated factors influence each other.36
A. Unit of Analysis
The main unit of analysis is China Railway Seventh Group Co. Ltd.
(CREC7), a subsidiary of China Railway Group Co. Ltd. (CREC)— the sec-
ond largest civil construction company in China and the second largest
international contractor in the world.37  As a subsidiary of CREC, CREC7
builds on a history of contracting large infrastructure projects in China
since 1950, and as a state-owned enterprise it enjoys strong connections
with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).38  At the time of the interviews
in 2010, CREC7 was involved in six African countries: the DRC, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia.39  Furthermore, its mother
company, CREC, has realized more than a thousand projects in thirty-five
African countries.40  CREC7 has been active in the DRC since June 2008: it
has a total of 450 employees in Kinshasa alone, of whom fifty-nine are
Chinese nationals.41  It is important to note the small proportion of Chi-
nese nationals because it is often assumed that Chinese contractors bring
in most of their staff from China and rarely create local jobs.42
The DRC was the second largest recipient of Chinese FDI in Africa in
2010, after South Africa.43  Located in the heart of Africa, this country
represents many of the challenges foreign investors encounter when doing
business in Africa (such as conflict, bad infrastructural facilities, and
authoritarian leadership) while it also possesses many much-desired natu-
ral resources (such as gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, and timber).44  The
35. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 21, at 499; Kolstad & Wiig, supra note 21;
Ramasamy et al., Consumer Support for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The Role of
Religion and Values, 91 J. BUS. ETHICS 61 (2010).
36. See Phil Hodkinson & Heather Hodkinson, The Strengths and Limitations of Case
Study Research (U. of Leeds, Working Paper for Learning & Skills Dev. Agency Confer-
ence, 2001).
37. China Railway Group Limited, CRIENGLISH.COM (Oct. 14, 2010), http://english
.cri.cn/7146/2010/10/14/2041s599390.htm.
38. Sanne van der Lugt, CREC7’s Infrastructural Investment in the DRC: An In-
Depth Study of the Motives for Chinese Outward FDI 29 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, University of Stellenbosch) (on file with the University of Stellenbosch).
39. Id. at 90.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 29.
42. See id.
43. See MINISTRY OF COM. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, 2010 STATISTICAL BULLETIN
OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 83– 84 (2010).
44. See The World Factbook: The Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.S. CENT. INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg
.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2015).
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Congolese government is actively trying to attract FDI.45  Chinese compa-
nies play a leading role in the investment in and construction of infrastruc-
ture in the DRC, a highly important sector to the development of the
country.
B. Sources of Information
The data for this study has been collected from three different sources
of evidence, namely face-to-face interviews, direct observations, and docu-
mentation.  The interviews and observations were conducted by the author
in the DRC in 2010 as part of a China-DAC Study Group project.  The aim
of this project was to examine the efficiency, impact, and sustainability of
Chinese participation in infrastructure development in Africa.46  For this
China-DAC project, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted
with the then-Chinese ambassador to the DRC; two representatives of
L’Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux (ACGT); a representative of the
Congolese Unit de Coordination des Projets (UCOOP); three Chinese pro-
ject managers of CREC7; a Chinese project manager of CREC8; and two
Chinese project managers of Sinohydro.  The interviews lasted for approxi-
mately one to one-and-a-half hours and provided interesting insights into
the motives behind the investments in the DRC.  The current Article is
based on the passages of the interviews that speak to the topic, and have
been extracted and analyzed separately for a Master’s thesis on the motives
of Chinese FDI.47  All interviews were held either in the office of the inter-
viewee or at the project site.  Conducting the interviews in the field offered
the opportunity for direct observation.  The observations were made in
Kinshasa (the capital of the DRC), the project sites of CREC7’s infrastruc-
ture projects in Kinshasa, and the offices of the managers interviewed dur-
ing the course of the field visits.
III. The Case of CREC7 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
This Part presents the case of CREC7 in the DRC.  The aim is to iden-
tify the range of factors— and their correlation— that seem to influence the
motives of this particular Chinese investor for investing in the DRC’s infra-
structure sector by using four different levels of analysis: the individual,
firm, national, and supranational levels.  Lee argues that the personal fac-
tors in his push-pull framework should be seen as a lens through which the
other factors are evaluated.48  Arguably, this also applies for investors
because no two companies from the same home country evaluate the pull
factors of a specific host country exactly the same way.  Therefore, this
45. See id.
46. Hans E. Petersen & Sanne van der Lugt, Chinese Participation in African Infra-
structure Development: The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia,
prepared for the China-DAC Study Group Event “Infrastructure: The Foundation for
Growth and Poverty Reduction” held in Beijing, Sept. 19– 20, 2010, http://www.ccs
.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Petersen_Lugt_ENG.pdf.
47. See van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 29.
48. See Lee, supra note 9, at 51.
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analysis starts from the individual and firm levels.  To understand the main
motives of CREC7 to invest in the DRC, it is necessary to have a thorough
understanding of the firm and its decision-makers in order to understand
fully their subjective evaluation of the push, pull, and intervening factors.
A. Individual Level
The business strategy and affairs of CREC are overseen by its seven-
member Board of Directors: two are executive directors (Li Changjin and
Yao Guiqing),49 four are independent non-executives (He Gong, Gong
Huazhang, Wang Taiwen, and Xin Dinghua),50 and one is a non-executive
(Han Guoxiu).51
Li Changjin joined the firm in 1982 and is currently the chairman of
CREC.52  Decision making is highly centralized in CREC: the chairman
decides— together with other leading members of the company and the gen-
eral manager of CREC for the DRC— whether subsidiaries of CREC will
invest in certain projects in the DRC.53  Besides being the chairman, Li is
also Secretary to the Communist Party Committee, revealing his connec-
tion with the CCP.54  Chen, Firth, and Xu state that the chairmen of state-
owned companies affiliated to the central Government (SOECGs) are “care-
fully chosen for their ability and many of them eventually become Vice
Ministers of the state.55  It is important that these chairmen do well in their
jobs so that they do not jeopardize their move up the state hierarchy.”56
These personal motives undoubtedly affected the way Li and other leading
members of the company perceived the push, pull, and intervening factors
related to investing in the DRC.
B. Firm Level
The firm-specific factors comprise the decision making structures in
the firm and the firm-specific advantages and disadvantages that shape the
lens through which the decision makers within CREC7 perceive the other
factors and their interrelationships.  CREC7 is a subsidiary of CREC: a Chi-
nese state-owned company affiliated with the central government.57  Since
the registration of precursor Railway Engineering Group Co. Ltd. (CRECG)
49. China Railway Group Ltd: People, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.reuters
.com/finance/stocks/companyOfficers?symbol=0390.HK#2kZcEHV609qXMpUB.97.
50. Id.
51. China Railway Group Ltd., Directors, CRECG (Jan. 2016), http://www.crecg
.com/en/tabid/194/Default.aspx.
52. Mr. Li Changjin: The Chairman of China Railway Group Limited, ASIA BRAND,
http://old.asiabrand.cn/en/expe/1336.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
53. See van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 90.
54. See Announcement, China Railway Group Ltd., Appointment of Directors, Super-
visors and Senior Management (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.crecg.com/Portals/1/fujian/
ANNOUNCEMENT%20APPOINTMENT%20OF%20DIRECTORS,%20SUPERVISORS%
20AND%20SENIOR%20MANAGEMENT.pdf.
55. Gongmen Chen et al., Does the Type of Ownership Control Matter? Evidence from
China’s Listed Companies, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 171, 174 (2009).
56. Id.
57. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 3.
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in 1990, the company has undergone major reforms and its structure
increasingly resembles that of a private company.58  Decisions to invest
abroad, however, are made at the highest level by the chairman of the
board, the general manager, and other leading members of CREC.59
CREC7 in the DRC has strong ties with the central government in Beijing
through both the Sicomines agreement60 and the chairman of CREC, Li
Changjin, who is also Secretary to the Communist Party Committee, as
mentioned above.  The embassy provides both support and interference
due to strong ties with the central government.61  The close relationship
with the government results in relatively easy access to finance in the form
of loans from the Chinese Export-Import Bank, the allocation of national
infrastructure projects thereby enhancing the company’s expertise and
experience, and the allocation of projects in the DRC via the Chinese
embassy there.62  Because of the embassy’s involvement, political and eco-
nomic aims are probably intertwined.
CREC is currently the second largest contractor in the world and
ranks seventy-ninth on the Fortune 500 list.63  CREC has undertaken the
construction of and provided construction-related services for more than
4,000 projects at home and abroad including railway, expressway, high-
way, bridge, tunnel, building construction, dredging, airport, and munici-
pal work projects; and has been active in more than sixty countries and
regions since the 1970s.64  Although CREC7 is involved in other kinds of
construction projects elsewhere, it focused only on the construction of
roads in the DRC because this was deemed to be the largest task at that
moment.65
58. See generally Corporate Introduction, CREC, http://www.crecg.com/en/tabid/
176/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
59. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 90.
60. In 2007, a Chinese consortium consisting of three Chinese SOEs— a bank (Exim
Bank) and two construction companies (CREC and Sinohydro)— concluded a USD nine
billion agreement with the Congolese government.  The Chinese investors obtained
thereby the right to mine ten million tons of copper and 600,000 tons of cobalt. DAVID
VAN REYBROUCK, CONGO: THE EPIC HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 528– 29 (2014); Peter Lee,
China’s Copper Deal Back in the Melt, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (June 12, 2009), http://www
.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KF12Cb02.html.  In exchange, the Chinese con-
sortium promised to invest USD three billion in mining infrastructure via a Chinese-
Congolese joint venture (Sicomines) with the Congolese mining company Gécamines,
with Gécamines retaining a thirty-two percent share in Sicomines. REYBROUCK, supra, at
529. Besides these investments in the mining sector, the Chinese consortium promised
to invest USD six billion in the construction of 3,400 kilometers of paved roads; 2,738
kilometers of unpaved roads; 3,215 kilometers of railway line; 5,000 houses; 145
polyclinics; thirty-one hospitals; two hydroelectric stations; two airports; and two uni-
versities. REYBROUCK, supra, at 529.  In order to deal with these large infrastructure
projects in a coordinated way, the Congolese government established the Sino-Con-
golese Programme within ACGT.
61. See van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 72.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Global 500— 2015, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/global500/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2016).
64. See generally Overseas Projects, CRECG, http://www.crecg.com/en/tabid/237/
Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
65. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 16.
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Experience in large infrastructure projects and close relationships
with the central government have given CREC7 some advantages for oper-
ating abroad.  The full scope of the advantages of CREC7, however, will
only become clear when taking into consideration the push and pull fac-
tors as well.
C. National Level
This section discusses both the factors associated with the home coun-
try, China (push factors), and the factors associated with the host country,
the DRC (pull factors); and how these factors are evaluated from the per-
spective of the decision makers within CREC7 and CREC.
The push factors are in this study defined as the factors that make it
favorable (+ sign) or unfavorable (–  sign) to invest in the home country.
This section discusses the factors commonly mentioned in general FDI the-
ory, as well as theory focused on Chinese outward FDI: macroeconomic
factors (market size, competition, and costs of labor and materials) and
institutional factors (quality of bureaucracy and rule of law, political stabil-
ity, and corruption).  China is the world’s fastest growing major economy
with a GDP growth of 7.3 percent for 2014.66  CREC has benefited heavily
from China’s economic boom.  The market for large infrastructure projects
in China, however, is showing signs of saturation.  China currently houses
four of the top five largest contractors in the world.67  With a saturation of
the domestic market, these companies face harsh competition within
China.  Chinese infrastructure contractors are looking for new markets
abroad— with price and speed as important competitive advantages— inher-
ited from the extreme competitive environment in China.  Table 1 sums up
the main push factors that seem to influence CREC7’s decision to invest
abroad.
Table 1. Push factors influencing CREC7’s investments in the DRC68
Evaluation Through
Push Factors Impact on CREC7 Lens of CREC7
Market size Market is showing signs of Negative
saturation69
66. Central Intelligence Agency, China, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2015), https://www
.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
67. Michael Fahy, The Top 25 Contractors in the World 2014, CONSTRUCTION WEEK
ONLINE (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-31980-the-top-
25-contractors-in-the-world-2014/.
68. World Bank Office Beijing: Quarterly Update, WORLD BANK (Apr. 2011), http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/04/29/
000356161_20110429003758/Rendered/PDF/614000Replacem1Quarterly1April1
2011.pdf. See Julie Chao, A Surprise: China’s Energy Consumption Will Stabilize,
BERKELEY LAB (Apr. 27, 2011), http://newscenter.lbl.gov/2011/04/27/china-energy-con
sumption-will-stabilize/.
69. China Labour Bulletin: Wages and Employment, CLB (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www
.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china.
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Evaluation Through
Push Factors Impact on CREC7 Lens of CREC7
Cost of labor + Standards of living are rising in Negative
availability China and therewith the
demands for higher wages;70
construction is one of the least
attractive options for young
workers in China71
Cost of materials Steel and concrete are available Positive
at low costs due to low
demand72
Presence of China currently houses four of Negative
competitors the top five largest contractors
in the world73
Corruption Relationships (guanxi) play an Neutral
important role in obtaining
projects74
Quality of Continuing complexity and Negative
bureaucracy/rule of uncertainty in the way the
law Chinese legal system operates75
Political stability Stable76 Positive
Go Global Strategy Encourages SOEs like CREC to Negative (stimulating
invest abroad (and to include CREC to invest
resource extraction activities) abroad)
Total 2x‘+’  1x‘0’  5x‘– ’
Pull factors are the factors in a host country that attract or deter for-
eign investors to invest in that particular country.  Recent empirical studies
on the determinants of Chinese ODI mainly focus on and test the impor-
tance of the following pull factors for Chinese ODI: market size (host coun-
try GDP), natural resources, cost of labor, technological know-how,
inflation, exchange rate, and risks (corruption, rule of law, quality of
bureaucracy, political stability, and socio-economic conditions) welcoming
to Chinese ODI— or, in other words, support from the host country govern-
70. China Labour Bulletin: China’s Ageing Construction Workers and the Urgent Need
for an Industry Overhaul, CLB (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/
china%C3%A2%E2%82%AC%E2%84%A2s-ageing-construction-workers-and-urgent-
need-industry-overhaul.
71. Huileng Tan, Goldman Sees More Pain for Iron Ore, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2015), http://
www.cnbc.com/2015/12/17/goldman-expects-iron-ore-prices-to-fall-further.html.
72. See Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 66.
73. Qian Cheng & Wanyi Tang, How Business Guanxi Affects a Firm’s Performance:
A Study on Chinese Small and Medium Sized Construction Companies 21 (May 25,
2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Uppsala University) (on file with Uppsala University).
74. See Child & Rodrigues, supra note 21, at 388; Pinsent Masons, Doing Business in
China: Part 1, Overview, OUT-LAW (Jan. 2015), http://www.out-law.com/en/topics/
projects— construction/community-infrastructure1/doing-business-in-china-part-1— -
overview/.
75. Wordwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK (2015), http://info.worldbank
.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports.
76. See van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 73– 77.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN106.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-MAY-16 17:06
192 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
ment.77  Table 2 displays these most commonly mentioned pull factors and
the evaluation of these factors through the lenses of CREC7.  Based on the
data gathered during the interviews, two other pull factors were added,
namely “cost of materials” and “presence of competitors.”78
Table 2. Pull factors influencing CREC7’s investments in the DRC79
Evaluation Through
Pull Factors Impact on CREC7 Lens of CREC7
Market size War-torn DRC is in desperate Positive
need of infrastructure80
Natural resources Play an important indirect role Positive
via the Sicomines agreement
and its mother company
CREC81
Cost of labor Cheap(er) labor will only Neutral
become a pull factor when local
workers are adequately
trained82
Cost of materials Local materials are cheaper, but Neutral
for some projects materials
need to be imported83
Technological know- Local workers need to be Negative
how trained84
Inflation No real risk85 Neutral
Presence of Low level of competition86 Positive
competitors
Corruption High risks and costs87 Negative
Quality of Not a large effect on CREC7 (in Neutral
bureaucracy/rule of contrast to CREC) because of
law relatively quick returns (as
opposed to the mining
industry)88
77. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 21; Kolstad & Wiig, supra note 21; Yin-Wong
Cheung & Xingwang Qian, The Empirics of China’s Outward Direct Investment (CESifo,
Working Paper Series No. 2621, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1392186.
78. See van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 82– 83.
79. Id. at 58– 60.
80. See Johanna Jansson, The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s International Relations 7 (S. Afr. Inst. Int’l Aff. Occasional
Paper No. 97, Oct. 2011).
81. See van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 81– 82.
82. Id. at 82.
83. Id. at 81.
84. Id. at 82– 83.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 83– 84.
87. Id. at 84.
88. Id. at 84– 85.
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Evaluation Through
Pull Factors Impact on CREC7 Lens of CREC7
Political stability Not a large effect on CREC7 (in Neutral
contrast to CREC) because of
relatively quick returns (as
opposed to the mining
industry); similar to the effect
of the “rule of law,” but not
mentioned in Van der Lugt
(2011)89
Infrastructure Bad conditions mean Positive
opportunities90
Welcoming to Special program for managing Positive
Chinese investments Chinese infrastructure
investments encourages FDI in
the infrastructure sector
Total 5x‘+’  5x‘0’  2x‘– ’
Western firms perceive the presence of other foreign investors a signif-
icant locational advantage (as an “agglomerative magnet”).91  It is an
important push factor, however, that Chinese investors seem to perceive
the presence of other foreign investors less positively due to the high level
of competition in their home country.92
Furthermore, the findings of this study show that, in contrast to Kol-
stad and Wiig’s assumption, the relatively inexperienced Congolese gov-
ernment is perceived as high risk by Chinese contractors in the DRC.93  In
fact, Chinese contractors in the DRC complain about the inefficient bureau-
cracy in the DRC, and one manager who previously worked in Zambia
referred with some nostalgia to the Zambian government as much more
“efficient” than the Congolese government.  The European Union— tired of
the lack of planning and the lack of entretien— resolved to work as little as
possible with the Congolese government and instead do as much as possi-
ble themselves.94  Chinese contractors, in contrast, work closely with the
Congolese government.  The China Program within ACGT was established
exactly for the purpose of dealing with big infrastructure projects managed
by Chinese contractors.95  ACGT has two other programs in addition to the
Sino-Congolese Program— namely a program for the World Bank and one
for Belgium; these are the three largest funders of infrastructure in the
DRC.96  The Congolese government is also closely involved in the
Sicomines agreement, and unless a project is a gift from the Chinese gov-
89. Id. at 85.
90. See id. at 78– 87.
91. See John H. Dunning, Location and the Multinational Enterprise: A Neglected Fac-
tor?, 40 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 5, 9 (2009).
92. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 84.
93. Id. at 85.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 87.
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ernment, the Chinese contractors have to deal with the slow and still ineffi-
cient Congolese bureaucracy.
D. Intervening Factors on Both a National and Supranational Level
Regarding migration theory framework, Lee argues that “between
every two points there stands a set of intervening obstacles which may be
slight in some instances and insurmountable in others.”97  In other words,
the decision for someone to migrate does not only depend on his or her
subjective evaluation of the respective push and pull factors, but also on
other factors that can impede the move.  Examples of intervening factors
are cultural distance, geographical distance, and an ocean or a mountain
which could impede the transportation to the country of destination.98
The “insurmountability” of these factors is relative according to Lee and
depends on “the impediments with which the [investor] is encumbered.”99
Similar to a migrant’s situation, there are also intervening factors that
might impede or support foreign direct investment.
The intervening factors commonly mentioned in the literature on Chi-
nese ODI— although not referred to as such— are geographical distance,
cultural distance, institutional distance, home-country support, and
agglomeration effect.100  Table 3 sums up these intervening factors and the
evaluation of these factors through the lenses of CREC7.  Home-country
support is split between deliberate support from the Chinese government
with the Go Global strategy, and indirect support via the capital market
imperfections in China.  The Sicomines agreement, in which CREC7 is
involved in the DRC, is often cited as an example of the Go Global strategy
of the Chinese government.101  Support from the Chinese government,
however, is more indirect than often assumed.  First of all, the Sicomines
agreement is a Congolese initiative: a Congolese delegation approached the
Chinese government with the suggestion for a similar resources-for-infra-
structure deal to the one China has with Angola.  The Sicomines agreement
is an agreement between the Congolese government and Chinese compa-
nies instead of a government-to-government agreement.  Both the Chinese
embassy in the DRC, however, and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce have
a decisive role in choosing infrastructure projects and allocating them to
the Chinese companies involved.  Besides the Sicomines agreement, the
Chinese government provides projects in the DRC for CREC7 and other
Chinese contractors by offering gifts to the Congolese government.  The
Chinese Government has made gifts to the DRC, such as 5.3 kilometers of
97. Lee, supra note 9, at 51.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See Buckley, supra note 21, at 499; Child & Rodrigues, supra note 21, at 381,
385; John Child & Svetla Marinova, The Role of Contextual Combinations in the Globaliza-
tion of Chinese Firms, 10 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 347, 347 (2014); Kolstad & Wiig, supra
note 21, at 26– 27; Morck, supra note 24, at 337.
101. See, e.g., Kent Hughes Butts & Brent Bankus, China’s Pursuit of Africa’s Natural
Resources, 1 COLLINS CTR. STUDY 1, 5 (2009); A Ravenous Dragon, THE ECONOMIST (Mar.
13, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10795714.
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the first stage of the Boulevard du 30 Juin and the Hôpital du Cin-
quantenaire.  Besides the Go Global strategy, it is argued that Chinese
firms are supported indirectly by the government due to high savings rates,
an abundance of foreign reserves, and the way these reserves are managed
by Chinese banks that make money (too) easily available for Chinese
SOEs.102  Additionally, intervention from the international community is
added to the table.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) criticized the
major minerals-for-infrastructure Sicomines deal and put pressure on the
Chinese companies until the latter cancelled three billion dollars of the
initial nine billion dollar deal.103
Table 3. Intervening factors influencing CREC7’s investments in the
DRC104
Effect on Decision
Intervening Factors Impact on CREC7 of CREC7
Geographical Extra costs for importing some, Negative –  medium
distance but not all, materials105
Cultural distance Higher risk and costs because Negative –  medium
(liability of of foreign language, culture,
foreignness) lack of network, etc.  Partly
solved, however, by strong
Chinese network and
increasing experience in DRC
Institutional distance Bureaucracy and corruption in Negative –  strong
the DRC is perceived to be
much worse than in China106
Exchange rate The exchange rate was pointed Negative –  strong
out by a manager of CREC7 as
one of the three pertinent risks
for CREC7’s investments in the
DRC107
Go Global strategy Promotes outward FDI either Positive –  strong
directly108 or indirectly109
Capital market There is quick and much Neutral
imperfections money available from the
Chinese Export-Import Bank;
Chinese contractors, however,
reported that they cannot rely
on the Bank and take most of
the risk themselves110
102. See Buckley, supra note 21, at 514.
103. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 62.
104. Id. at 82.
105. Id. at 84.
106. Id. at 82– 83.
107. See, e.g., Butts & Bankus, supra note 101; A Ravenous Dragon, supra note 101.
108. See Jansson, supra note 80, at 7.
109. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 79– 80.
110. Id. at 82– 89.
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Effect on Decision
Intervening Factors Impact on CREC7 of CREC7
Diplomatic relations Relations between China and Positive –  strong
the DRC are strong and the
Chinese government offers
infrastructure projects to the
Congolese government as gifts
which are constructed by
Chinese firms
Intervention from Three billion loan for Unknown
the international infrastructure projects was
community cancelled under pressure from
the IMF
Total 4x‘– ’  2x‘+’  2x‘0’
In the case of CREC7’s decision to invest in the DRC, the geographical
and cultural distance between China and the DRC are affecting CREC7’s
operations in the DRC; they do not, however, seem to be very important
determinants for China’s choice to invest in the DRC due to CREC7’s net-
work in the DRC and the wider region.  In other words, these intervening
factors are not “unbridgeable,” especially not for the “dominant leader in
building highly complex ultra-long railway bridge [sic]” in China.111  The
complaints about the inefficient bureaucracy and level of corruption in the
DRC, as mentioned above, show that these Chinese managers do not per-
ceive the institutional environment in the DRC as very similar to the Chi-
nese institutional environment.
It is difficult to determine whether the (potential) critique of the IMF
has been regarded as a serious obstacle by Chinese investors.  During the
interview, a Congolese ambassador— who was a member of the Congolese
delegation to China that initiated and negotiated the Sicomines agree-
ment— stated that the Chinese government warned the Congolese govern-
ment to be careful not to lose its traditional donors because of the
Sicomines agreement.112  The Congolese ambassador said that the Chinese
government urged their Congolese counterparts to consult the IMF before
starting the negotiations, which implies that an important part of the dis-
cussion took place behind the scenes.  At least, it can be assumed that it
was an anticipated obstacle.
IV. Discussion
When looking at the structure of the company, it becomes apparent
that the board of directors of CREC is strongly connected to the central
government.  The strong connection with the Chinese government, the
experience of CREC7 to carry out large infrastructure projects, and the
experience of operating in a challenging institutional environment seem to
111. Railway, CREC, http://www.crecg.com/en/tabid/234/Default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 8, 2015).
112. Van der Lugt, supra note 38, at 62.
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be the most pertinent firm-specific factors that shape the lenses through
which CREC7 evaluates the push, pull, and intervening factors involved in
the decision to invest in the DRC.
When the above findings are combined and illustrated like the push-
pull framework of Lee, the DRC looks like a country with both challenges
and opportunities for CREC7 (see Figure 2).113
Figure 2. Illustration of push, pull, and intervening factors in CREC7’s


























The exercise of evaluating the political economic factors in the Chi-
nese context and how they influence the decision of CREC to invest abroad
resulted in five negative, one neutral, and two positive evaluations.  These
are illustrated as ‘+’, ‘0’, and ‘– ’ signs in the circle that refer to China in
Figure 2.  The combination of a saturating market and a high level of com-
petition with a weak rule of law makes China less favorable for further
investment.  Figure 2 also shows that the DRC is a challenging but promis-
ing environment for CREC7, with more factors that attract CREC7 (five)
than factors that deter CREC7 (two).  The lack of skilled workers, the weak
rule of law, and— linked to that— corruption, are the most constraining fac-
tors for CREC7’s investments in the DRC.
It is the interrelatedness between the main push, pull, intervening, and
firm-specific factors, however, that reinforces some of the pull factors for
CREC7 in the DRC.  CREC7’s main incentives to invest abroad are the satu-
rating market and increasing competition at home.  It is therein supported
by the Chinese government, which is promoting Chinese outward invest-
ment via the Go Global Strategy.  The DRC as a host country has certain
advantages and disadvantages for CREC7.  The advantages are closely
linked to the disadvantages at home, namely the huge demand for infra-
structure and low level of competition in the DRC.115  The main disadvan-
113. See Lee, supra note 9, at 51– 52.
114. See generally id. (providing a template for illustrating push, pull, and intervening
factors).
115. See supra Table 2.
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tages— namely corruption, quality of bureaucracy, and the exchange rate
between China and the DRC— are somewhat compensated by the support
CREC7 receives from both the Congolese and Chinese governments, and
linked to the ownership structure of CREC7.116
Conclusion
Growing emphasis is placed on the responsibility the host country
government has to realize the potentials of incoming Chinese FDI while
avoiding negative social and environmental impacts.  This Article’s main
argument is that one can draw conclusions about the potential for host
country governments to strengthen their FDI regulation based on thorough
knowledge about the motives of (potential) foreign investors to invest in the
respective country.  Various scholars have demonstrated that general FDI
theory is not sufficient for the study of the motives for investment by Chi-
nese MNEs.  One of the reasons for this lack of applicability of mainstream
IB theory to explain the motives for Chinese ODI is a strong emphasis on
the pull factors for investment in mainstream IB theory, as argued in this
Article.  Instead of merely questioning the applicability of mainstream IB
theory to the study of Chinese ODI, it would be more useful for scholars to
establish a comprehensive framework that serves to study the motives for
ODI from any country of origin.  This Article introduces a model from
migration theory into IB theory as an inspiration for developing such a
framework.  Lee’s push-pull framework has been applied to the case of a
specific Chinese investor (CREC7) in the infrastructure sector in the DRC
in order to study the potential of this model to help identify the range of
factors— and their correlation— that influences the motives of a specific for-
eign investor.
The collected data from the desktop research and the fieldwork
showed how conditions in China, conditions in the DRC, firm-specific fac-
tors, and intervening factors influence each other in a highly complex way.
In order to illustrate this complexity, the factors that influence each other
most actively can be grouped together in clusters.  The cluster of factors
that are of specific importance for CREC7’s decision to invest in the DRC
are (1) connections with the central Chinese Government, access to
finance, experience and skills, and market access; and (2) experience and
skills, high level of competition in the domestic market, high demand for
infrastructure in the DRC, and the relatively low level of competition in
large infrastructure projects in the DRC.  These seem to be the main sets of
factors that impel CREC7 to invest in the infrastructure sector in the DRC.
These findings are in line with the suggestion by Buckley et al., Kolstad and
Wiig, and Ramasamy et al. that connections with the Chinese government
do encourage Chinese investments abroad.  As discussed, the close rela-
tionship with the government and the active support of the government via
the Go Global strategy result in relatively easy access to finance in the form
of loans from Export-Import Bank.  The allocation of national infrastruc-
116. See supra Table 1, Table 2, Table 3.
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ture projects thereby enhances the company’s expertise and experience,
and the allocation of projects in the DRC via the Chinese embassy there.
The findings of this study, however, also show that a good relationship
with the Chinese government is only one factor within this complex struc-
ture of factors that influences the motives of CREC7 to invest in the DRC.
Other factors, such as the level of competition, seem to influence strongly
the motives of CREC7 as well.  Furthermore, Kolstad and Wiig’s contention
that “Chinese investment is more attracted to a country with natural
resources, the worse the institutional environment of that country,” and
that therefore “Chinese FDI is conducted to exploit countries with poor
institutions and large natural resources,” is not supported by the findings
of this study, because the factors that attract Chinese overseas investment
are more various and their correlations are more complex.117  The findings
therefore confirm the necessity of a holistic approach when studying the
motives of Chinese and other foreign investors.
In the discussions on the motives of Chinese ODI, one can almost for-
get the role of the FDI host countries.  For these countries, the social and
environmental impacts of economic activities by foreign investors are real,
and they face the difficulty of striking a balance between attracting high
volumes of foreign investment to help stimulate economic growth, and
ameliorating possible harmful outcomes to the environment and society.
Navigating between pressing domestic concerns, steering incoming FDI to
meet developmental needs, and avoiding disinvestment can be challenging.
Comprehensive research on the factors that influence the motives of for-
eign investors can help African leaders to achieve a balance between
attracting FDI by deregulating, and controlling FDI by enforcing strict laws
and regulations, thereby harnessing the full potential of incoming FDI.
Addendum: Limitations
This study also identified some pertinent challenges that require
future research.  For example, this study showed that the evaluation of the
push, pull, and intervening factors is subjective and depends on the firm-
specific factors and also the individual characteristics of the decision-mak-
ers of a firm.  In order to get a better understanding of the individual
motives of the decision-makers, it is not sufficient to collect background
information on these persons.  Instead, one needs to interview the actual
decision-makers in the headquarters of the firm.  The opinion of Chinese
investors themselves is still lacking in current research on Chinese ODI.
Another factor that should be taken into account is the history of the
firm, and its experiences and lessons learned in the host country.  The
evaluation of the push, pull, and intervening factors is a snapshot and
changes over time due to both internal and external changes.  Internally,
the firm gains knowledge and experiences and is likely to adapt its invest-
ment strategies accordingly.  Externally, the policies towards outward FDI
117. See Kolstad & Wiig, supra note 21, at 27, 33.
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in the home country and inward FDI in the host country are likely to
change over time and affect the decision of the firm to stay and invest more
or leave.  These changes and their potential effects also need to be taken
into account in a new, comprehensive framework that explains the motives
behind ODI.  Therefore, there is a need for more qualitative (case study)
research in order to get a better insight into these dynamics, not only for
Chinese investors, but for foreign investors in general.  In other words, it is
necessary to develop further this new framework on FDI and to make it
more dynamic.
